Friday, June 10, 2011

Breach of Marriage Promise and Seduction

Seduction and Breach of promise

http://www.legalcity.net/Index.cfm?fuseaction=RIGHTS.article&ArticleID=7012600
A man who promises marriage, has sexual relations with his fiancèe and then deserts her, may be sued for seduction as well as for breach of promise - as long as his fiancèe was a virgin before they had sex. If a child is born of their sexual union, the man can be sued for confinement expenses incurred by the woman as well as for support for the child until it is old enough to earn its own living. This money is usually paid to the woman on a monthly basis.

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American Jurisprudence, Second Edition. 
Database updated July 2007

Seduction: Cr
iminal Liability


West's Key Number Digest, Seduction 29, 30, 33 to 35


"Seduction" has been defined as the act of a man enticing a woman to have unlawful intercourse with him by means of persuasion, solicitation, promises, 
bribes, or other means, without the employment of force.[ FN1] Furthermore, seduction has been said to signify a leading astray, and has been described as the act 
of persuading or inducing a woman of previously chaste character to yield to sexual intercourse by the use of any species of arts, persuasion, deceit, false promises, or other artifices which are calculated to have and do have that 
effect.[FN2]

In some instances, "seduction" has referred to the act of a "designing woman" 
in enticing a man to engage in sexual intercourse with her.[ FN3]

A state seduction statute that applied only to men because of the definition of 
"seduction" as the act of a man enticing a woman to have unlawful intercourse with 
him by means of persuasion, solicitation, promises, bribes, or other means without 
employment of force, has been held to be unconstitutional.[ FN4]



Force is generally a necessary element in establishing the offense of 
rape,[FN5] as is the absence of the victim's consent.[ FN6] Where force is not employed to overcome reluctance, and where consent, however reluctant initially, can 
be spelled out, this we label "seduction," which society may condone even as it

disapproves. Furthermore, in seduction, unlike rape, the consent of the woman, implied or explicit, has been procured by artifice, deception, flattery, fraud, or 
promise. These devices cannot supply the element of force and an absence of consent that are essential to the crime of rape and distinguish it from seduction.

However, the mere threat of force can suffice to remove the conduct from the 
province of a criminal seduction statute and make it rape. Furthermore, there is some conduct which comes close to the line between rape and seduction.[FN7]

"Sexual misconduct" differs from seduction, in that seduction involves allurement, enticement, or persuasion to overcome unwillingness or resistance.[FN8]



"Actions for injuries to personal rights" include libel, slander, criminal conversation, seduction, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. Gremminger v. 
Missouri Labor and Indus. Relations Com'n, 129 S.W.3d 399 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D.

2004).


[FN1] Carter v. State, 775 So. 2d 91 (Miss. 1999); Edwards v. Moore, 699 So.
2d 220 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997).
[FN2] Hirschy v. Coodley, 116 Cal. App. 2d 102, 253 P.2d 93 (2d Dist. 1953).
Seduction is the act of seducing; the act of a man enticing a woman to have 
unlawful intercourse with him by means of persuasion, solicitation, promises, bribes, or other means without employment of force. Slawek v. Stroh, 
62 Wis. 2d 295, 215 N.W.2d 9 (1974).

Seduction imports the idea of illicit intercourse accomplished by the use of 
arts, persuasions, or wiles to overcome the resistance of a female who is 
not disposed of her own volition to step aside from the paths of virtue.

Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 150 Cal. App. 3d 992, 198 Cal. Rptr. 273, 40 
A.L.R.4th 1083 (2d Dist. 1984).

[FN3] Hart v. Knapp, 76 Conn. 135, 55 A. 1021 (1903); Blount v. State, 102 
Fla. 1100, 138 So. 2, 80 A.L.R. 830 (1931).

[FN4] § 9.
[FN5] Am. Jur. 2d, Rape § 3.
[FN6] Am. Jur. 2d, Rape § 5.
[FN7] People v. Evans, 85 Misc. 2d 1088, 379 N.Y.S.2d 912 (Sup 1975).
As to elements of the offense of seduction, generally, see §§ 3 to 7.
As to consent as an element of seduction, generally, see § 4.
[FN8] People v. Hough, 159 Misc. 2d 997, 607 N.Y.S.2d 884 (Dist. Ct. 1994)
(statute defining sexual misconduct requires proof that lack of consent resulted from forcible compulsion or from incapacity to consent and did not provide for conviction based on allegation that consent given was vitiated 
by fraud).

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Qualified seduction: 12-18 years. There is abuse of authority,confidence,or relationship 


Simple seduction
12-18 years: OFR is of good reputation, single or widow.

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The crime of qualified seduction has some of the following elements: 
a) the offended party is a virgin; 
b) she must be over 12 and under 18 years of age; 
c) the offender has sexual intercourse with her; 
d) there is abuse of authority, of confidence or of relationship. 
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If the offender is the brother or ascendant of the victim, elements (a) and (b) are dispensed with.
http://bataspinoy.wordpress.com/2011/05/04/the-elements-of-the-crime-of-qualified-seduction/

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The Canadian Criminal Code, 1892, S.C. 1892, c. 29, s. 182.


[Seduction under promise of marriage.]
182. Every one, above the age of twenty-one years, is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to two years’ imprisonment who, under promise of marriage, seduces and has illicit connection with any unmarried female of previously chaste character under twenty-one years of age. 50-51 V., c. 48, s. 2.

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Breach of Marriage Promise
http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Breach+of+Marriage+Promise
A common-law right of action for breaking a commitment to enter into matrimony.

Agreement to Marry
An agreement to marry is different from all other contractual relations. The reason for this is that both its object and the relationship created between the parties are completely different from those of any other contract. In order to recover for breach of promise, the plaintiff must establish that the two parties had a valid existing contract to marry. This can be accomplished by a showing that both parties had a clear intent for the agreement to be binding.

If the parties to a contract to marry are incapable of creating a valid agreement due to a legal disability, a lawsuit for breach of marriage promise cannot be sustained. Generally, a valid defense to such an action is the infancy of the promisor at the time of the agreement. The infancy of the promisee, however, is not a valid defense. Statutes provide the ages of infancy.

An individual who is incapable of making a contract due to incompetence will not be held liable for breach of promise. Similarly, a promise to marry someone who is already married is invalid, provided the promisee knew this fact. When the plaintiff was unaware that the promisor was already married, however, he or she may recover. Upon the legal termination of the marriage by Divorce, Annulment, or death of the former spouse, a defendant who breaches a promise to marry the plaintiff may be held liable.

A breach of contract action cannot be maintained when a marriage would be unlawful due to Incest.

Offer and Acceptance
Fundamental elements to the creation of a marriage contract are an offer and acceptance. It is not necessary that the offer be in formal language. The key requirement is that both parties comprehend that there was a clearly intended offer of marriage. A statement of the intention to marry to a third person, absent any other indicated intent, is not enough.

An acceptance of an offer to marry must be given within a reasonable period of time. Such acceptance need not be formal but may be implied from the promisee's behavior. For a marriage contract to be enforceable, there must be a showing that there has been a meeting of the minds of the individuals to the agreement. A promise to marry induced by duress is invalid. Similarly, a promise to marry made by fraudulent inducement—or fraudulent concealment of facts that would prevent the making of the agreement if revealed or disclosed—will render the promise invalid and relieve the innocent party from all liability.

A promise to marry must be based upon legal consideration. Generally, one individual's promise is adequate consideration for the promise of the other party. A promise to marry must not be based solely upon illegal or immoral consideration, such as sexual relations between the parties. A promise based upon legal consideration will not, however, be vitiated merely because unlawful sexual intercourse took place between the parties either prior to or following the promise.

If a promise to marry is conditional, liability for its breach will arise only following the performance or occurrence of the agreed condition.

A contract to marry may be manifested by many promises made at different times; however, there is only a single contract, and only a single breach can take place.

A contract to marry can be rescinded either by mutual consent of the parties or in instances of Fraud or duress. The consent to postpone a marriage alone does not constitute a release of the obligation to perform it.

Breach
Unless there is a legally justifiable reason, an unwillingness to perform one's promise to marry creates a breach of promise to marry. Mere postponement of the wedding does not constitute a breach unless it is done arbitrarily and for no good reason. In such case, the postponement can be regarded as equivalent to a refusal to comply with the marital promise.

Defenses
Defenses exist other than the invalidity or termination of the marriage contract and lack of capacity.

The invalidity of the plaintiff's divorce from a former spouse may be used as a defense only if the issue of the divorce is raised on the ground that there was a lack of jurisdiction on the part of the court to permit the divorce. If the plaintiff had an invalid divorce, the defendant cannot be held liable for breach of the marriage promise because the plaintiff was still lawfully married to his or her former mate and, therefore, could not validly contract a marriage with the defendant.

A valid defense to a breach of marriage promise is the plaintiff's refusal to marry the defendant. The defendant cannot later defend himself or herself on the basis of the fact that he or she subsequently offered to marry the plaintiff. The engagement of the plaintiff to another individual at the time of entering into a contract with the defendant is not a defense. Similarly, the marriage of the plaintiff to another party subsequent to the defendant's breach does not excuse the defendant of liability for a breach. Unattractive personality traits, or offensive conduct, such as drunkenness, cannot be used as a defense. When the objectionable behavior amounts to a felony, however, it can be used as a defense against the plaintiff in a breach of marriage promise action.

Generally, a defendant will successfully defeat an action by alleging physical incapacity or disease that makes it either unsafe or improper to enter into marriage. If a defendant has knowledge of the disability when he or she promises to marry the plaintiff there is no defense. A disability on the part of the defendant that would not interfere with the marital relationship is insufficient to relieve a defendant of his promise.

Damages

The nature and form of an action for breach of marriage promise is contractual. Recoverable damages include Compensatory Damages for injury to the feelings and health of the plaintiff as well as to his or her reputation. A plaintiff may also recover damages for any financial loss resulting from the breach, comparable to the recovery in a breach of any other contract action, in addition to compensation for loss of advantages that would have stemmed from a marital relationship with the defendant.

Further readings
Hirshman, Linda, and Jane Larson. 1998. Hard Bargains: The Politics of Sex. Don Mills, Ont.: Oxford Univ. Press.

Tushnet, Rebecca. 1998. "Rules of Engagement: Laws Regarding Broken Marital Engagements." Yale Law Journal 107 (June): 2583–618.

Wallman, Lester, and Sharon McDonnell. 1994. Cupid, Couples, and Contracts: A Guide to Living Together, Prenuptial Agreements, and Divorce. Sandy, Ore.: MasterMedia.

‘Sexual exploitation’ on promise of marriage


‘Sexual exploitation’ on promise of marriage
Wednesday, April 20, 2011
http://lawjustice-bakeelsab.blogspot.com/2011/04/sexual-exploitation-on-promise-of.html
‘Sexual exploitation’ on promise of marriage
Most of the rape cases are meticulously well-planned to satisfy uncontrolled sexual lust and to realize sensuous celluloid images and fantasies with a sole motive to dominate over women. In fact before committing actual rape or ‘date rape’, rehearsal takes place many times in the intoxicated brain of the rapist. Invariably the victim is blamed, insulted and humiliated even by her own family members for slurring the so called ‘family honour and reputation’.
Having sex with a girl on the false promise of marriage and later refusing to tie the marriage knot may amount to commission of rape, particularly when the boy from very inception had no intention of marrying the girl. We may term it as ‘sexual exploitation’ on promise of marriage. Most often boys develop physical relations on false promise of marriage and continue till she become pregnant. Some time it is very difficult to abort and the matter come to the knowledge of family and neighbours. Mostly at that later stage cases are registered against the persons. Indian Courts have confronted several times with the question “whether Sexual intercourse with any girl on a false ‘promise of marriage’ is consent or not? If not Rape, is it ‘cheating’ or not?

If fully grown up girl consents to sex on a promise of marriage until she becomes pregnant is promiscuity
Calcutta High Court in Jayanti Rani Panda v. State of West Bengal & Anr., wherein the accused was a teacher of the local village school and used to visit the residence of the prosecutrix. One day during the absence of the parents of the prosecutrix he expressed his love for her and his desire to marry her. The prosecutrix was also willing and the accused promised to marry her once he obtained the consent of his parents. Acting on such assurance the prosecutrix started cohabiting with the accused and this continued for several months during which period the accused spent several nights with her. Eventually when she conceived and insisted that the marriage should be performed as quickly as possible, the accused suggested an abortion and agreed to marry her later. Since the proposal was not acceptable to the prosecutrix, the accused disowned the promise and stopped visiting her house. It was held that “if a fully grown up girl consents to the act of sexual intercourse on a promise of marriage and continues to indulge in such activity until she becomes pregnant it is an act of promiscuity on her part and not an act induced by misconception of fact and Section 90 IPC cannot be invoked unless the court can be assured that from the inception accused never intended to marry her.” (1984) Cri.L.J.1535, also see Hari Majhi vs. The State : 1990 Crl. L.J. 650 and Abhoy Pradhan vs. State of West Bengal : 1999 Crl. L.J. 3534.)

It amounts to cheating not rape
In another case the petitioner had sexual intercourse with the victim girl several times on false promise of marriage and she became pregnant. She informed her parents, and got Panchyat held on 30.7.1984 where again the petitioner gave false assurance that he would marry the girl. But when her parents requested him to marry her, he and the other accused persons abused girl and her parents and assaulted them with fists and slaps and chased and drove them inside their own house.
Relying on Jayanti Rani Panda case Hon’ble Justice Ram Nandan Prasad, of Patna High Court held that “though on the facts of the case, an offence of rape is not made out, it is obvious that by holding out the false promise of marriage the petitioner fraudulently induced the complainant to have sexual intercourse with him and but for this false promise she would not have consented to have sexual intercourse with him. The act of the petitioner, therefore, amounts to cheating as defined in Section 415, I.P.C. and as such prima facie amounts to an offence under Section 417, I.P.C. Besides this act of cheating, the petitioner and other accused are also alleged to have indulged in assaulting the intimidating the complainant and her parents which prima facie would give rise to an offences under Sections 323, and 506, I.P.C.” (Mir Wali Mohammad @ Kalu vs The State Of Bihar (1991 (1) BLJR 247 Order dated 2/7/1990)

‘intentional inducement’ giving ‘false of promise of marriage’ is cheating
Before Hon’ble Justice B.B. Vagyani of Bombay High Court the short point that arises for consideration is whether the offence of cheating as defined under section 415 of I.P.C. embraces cases in which no transfer of property is occasioned by the deception.

Case of emotions and passion in weak moments
In this case the prosecutrix is a divorced woman. After divorce, the prosecutrix started residing with her mother, where the accused came in contact with the prosecutrix. The casual acquaintance ultimately culminated into a love affair and after giving promise of marriage, he sexually exploited the prosecutrix on number of occasions. The nature brought this ‘indecent affair’ on the surface. When the prosecutrix became pregnant she asked the accused to fulfil his promise of marriage, but he flately refused to marry prosecutrix. Thereafter, the prosecutrix lodged a criminal complaint against the petitioner-accused on 30th April 1992 at Police Station, Adavat. FIR was registered under section 376 IPC and the Additional Sessions Judge, Amalner, Dist. Jalgaon, framed additional charge under section 417 of I.P.C. against the petitioner-accused.
While deciding quashing petition Hon’ble Justice Vagyani strongly relied on Marah Chandra Paul v. State of Tripura, (1997 C.R.I. 715) and held that the prosecutrix was intentionally induced to submit to sexual intercourse on false promise of marriage. The overt act on the part of the petitioner-accused has certainly caused damage or harm in body, mind and reputation of the person deceived. The indulgence of the petitioner-accused in sex with prosecutrix by means of ‘intentional inducement’ after giving ‘false of promise of marriage’ squarely falls within the ‘mischief’ of the definition of cheating as defined under section 415 of I.P.C. which is punishable under section 417 of I.P.C.” (Atmaram Mahadu More Vs State of Maharashtra (1998 (5) Bom CR 201 Order dated 13/11/1997)
Sufficient intelligence, significance and moral quality
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Uday Vs State of Karnataka on 19.2.2003 held that no straitjacket formula can be laid down for determining whether consent given by the prosecutrix was voluntary or under a misconception of fact, but following factors stand out;
a.   where a girl was of 19 years of age and had sufficient intelligence to understand the significance and moral quality of the act she was consenting to;
b.   she was conscious of the fact that her marriage was difficult on account of caste considerations;
c.    it was difficult to impute to the appellant knowledge the prosecutrix had consented in consequence of a misconception of fact arising from his promise, and
d.   there was no evidence to prove conclusively that the appellant never intended to marry the prosecutrix.
Case of emotions and passion in weak moments
http://lawjustice-bakeelsab.blogspot.com/2011/04/sexual-exploitation-on-promise-of.html
Wednesday, April 20, 2011
‘Sexual exploitation’ on promise of marriage
‘Sexual exploitation’ on promise of marriage
Most of the rape cases are meticulously well-planned to satisfy uncontrolled sexual lust and to realize sensuous celluloid images and fantasies with a sole motive to dominate over women. In fact before committing actual rape or ‘date rape’, rehearsal takes place many times in the intoxicated brain of the rapist. Invariably the victim is blamed, insulted and humiliated even by her own family members for slurring the so called ‘family honour and reputation’.
Having sex with a girl on the false promise of marriage and later refusing to tie the marriage knot may amount to commission of rape, particularly when the boy from very inception had no intention of marrying the girl. We may term it as ‘sexual exploitation’ on promise of marriage. Most often boys develop physical relations on false promise of marriage and continue till she become pregnant. Some time it is very difficult to abort and the matter come to the knowledge of family and neighbours. Mostly at that later stage cases are registered against the persons. Indian Courts have confronted several times with the question “whether Sexual intercourse with any girl on a false ‘promise of marriage’ is consent or not? If not Rape, is it ‘cheating’ or not?

If fully grown up girl consents to sex on a promise of marriage until she becomes pregnant is promiscuity
Calcutta High Court in Jayanti Rani Panda v. State of West Bengal & Anr., wherein the accused was a teacher of the local village school and used to visit the residence of the prosecutrix. One day during the absence of the parents of the prosecutrix he expressed his love for her and his desire to marry her. The prosecutrix was also willing and the accused promised to marry her once he obtained the consent of his parents. Acting on such assurance the prosecutrix started cohabiting with the accused and this continued for several months during which period the accused spent several nights with her. Eventually when she conceived and insisted that the marriage should be performed as quickly as possible, the accused suggested an abortion and agreed to marry her later. Since the proposal was not acceptable to the prosecutrix, the accused disowned the promise and stopped visiting her house. It was held that “if a fully grown up girl consents to the act of sexual intercourse on a promise of marriage and continues to indulge in such activity until she becomes pregnant it is an act of promiscuity on her part and not an act induced by misconception of fact and Section 90 IPC cannot be invoked unless the court can be assured that from the inception accused never intended to marry her.” (1984) Cri.L.J.1535, also see Hari Majhi vs. The State : 1990 Crl. L.J. 650 and Abhoy Pradhan vs. State of West Bengal : 1999 Crl. L.J. 3534.)

It amounts to cheating not rape
In another case the petitioner had sexual intercourse with the victim girl several times on false promise of marriage and she became pregnant. She informed her parents, and got Panchyat held on 30.7.1984 where again the petitioner gave false assurance that he would marry the girl. But when her parents requested him to marry her, he and the other accused persons abused girl and her parents and assaulted them with fists and slaps and chased and drove them inside their own house.
Relying on Jayanti Rani Panda case Hon’ble Justice Ram Nandan Prasad, of Patna High Court held that “though on the facts of the case, an offence of rape is not made out, it is obvious that by holding out the false promise of marriage the petitioner fraudulently induced the complainant to have sexual intercourse with him and but for this false promise she would not have consented to have sexual intercourse with him. The act of the petitioner, therefore, amounts to cheating as defined in Section 415, I.P.C. and as such prima facie amounts to an offence under Section 417, I.P.C. Besides this act of cheating, the petitioner and other accused are also alleged to have indulged in assaulting the intimidating the complainant and her parents which prima facie would give rise to an offences under Sections 323, and 506, I.P.C.” (Mir Wali Mohammad @ Kalu vs The State Of Bihar (1991 (1) BLJR 247 Order dated 2/7/1990)

‘intentional inducement’ giving ‘false of promise of marriage’ is cheating
Before Hon’ble Justice B.B. Vagyani of Bombay High Court the short point that arises for consideration is whether the offence of cheating as defined under section 415 of I.P.C. embraces cases in which no transfer of property is occasioned by the deception.

In this case the prosecutrix is a divorced woman. After divorce, the prosecutrix started residing with her mother, where the accused came in contact with the prosecutrix. The casual acquaintance ultimately culminated into a love affair and after giving promise of marriage, he sexually exploited the prosecutrix on number of occasions. The nature brought this ‘indecent affair’ on the surface. When the prosecutrix became pregnant she asked the accused to fulfil his promise of marriage, but he flately refused to marry prosecutrix. Thereafter, the prosecutrix lodged a criminal complaint against the petitioner-accused on 30th April 1992 at Police Station, Adavat. FIR was registered under section 376 IPC and the Additional Sessions Judge, Amalner, Dist. Jalgaon, framed additional charge under section 417 of I.P.C. against the petitioner-accused.
While deciding quashing petition Hon’ble Justice Vagyani strongly relied on Marah Chandra Paul v. State of Tripura, (1997 C.R.I. 715) and held that the prosecutrix was intentionally induced to submit to sexual intercourse on false promise of marriage. The overt act on the part of the petitioner-accused has certainly caused damage or harm in body, mind and reputation of the person deceived. The indulgence of the petitioner-accused in sex with prosecutrix by means of ‘intentional inducement’ after giving ‘false of promise of marriage’ squarely falls within the ‘mischief’ of the definition of cheating as defined under section 415 of I.P.C. which is punishable under section 417 of I.P.C.” (Atmaram Mahadu More Vs State of Maharashtra (1998 (5) Bom CR 201 Order dated 13/11/1997)
Sufficient intelligence, significance and moral quality
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Uday Vs State of Karnataka on 19.2.2003 held that no straitjacket formula can be laid down for determining whether consent given by the prosecutrix was voluntary or under a misconception of fact, but following factors stand out;
a.   where a girl was of 19 years of age and had sufficient intelligence to understand the significance and moral quality of the act she was consenting to;
b.   she was conscious of the fact that her marriage was difficult on account of caste considerations;
c.    it was difficult to impute to the appellant knowledge the prosecutrix had consented in consequence of a misconception of fact arising from his promise, and
d.   there was no evidence to prove conclusively that the appellant never intended to marry the prosecutrix.


In fact Hon’ble Justice N. Santosh Hegde & B.P. Singh serious doubted that the promise to marry induced the prosecutrix to consent to having sexual intercourse with the appellant. She knew that her marriage with the appellant was difficult on account of caste considerations and was bound to meet with stiff opposition from members of both families. She was clearly conscious, that the marriage may not take place at all despite the promise of the appellant. However the appellant had reason to believe that the consent is given due to deep love for each other as they met often, she permitted him liberties, which is permitted only to a person with whom one is in deep love. She stealthily went out with the appellant to a lonely place at 12 O'clock in the night. It usually happens when two young persons are madly in love and promise loses all significance, particularly when they are over come with emotions and passion in weak moments; succumb to the temptation of having sexual relationship. The girl willingly consented to having sexual intercourse with the appellant with whom she was deeply in love, not because he promised to marry her, but because she also desired it. [2003 (4) SCC 46]
Genuine intention under family pressure
Hon’ble Justice P. Venkatarama Reddi & P.P. Naolekar of Supreme Court on 3.11.2004 observed that “we have no doubt that the accused did hold out the promise to marry her and that was the predominant reason for the victim girl to agree to the sexual intimacy with him. Girl was also too keen to marry him as she said so specifically. But we find no evidence which gives rise to an inference beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had no intention to marry her at all from the inception and that the promise he made was false to his knowledge. On the other hand, the statement of  girl that 'later on', the accused became ready to marry her but his father and others took him away from the village would indicate that the accused might have been prompted by a genuine intention to marry which did not materialize on account of the pressure exerted by his family elders. It seems to be a case of breach of promise to marry rather than a case of false promise to marry. [Deelip Singh Alias Dilip Kumar v. State of Bihar,2005 (1) SCC 88]
Pay Rs.50,000/- for ‘reprehensible conduct’
Hon’ble judges however observed that the appellant, no doubt extricates himself from the clutches of the penal law by getting the ‘benefit of doubt’ on charge leveled against him. But, we cannot ignore the ‘reprehensible conduct’ of the appellant, who by promising to marry the victim woman, persuaded her to have sexual relations and caused pregnancy. The act of the accused left behind her a trail of misery, ignominy and trauma. He was held liable for damages and the appellant happily agreed to pay Rs.50,000 by way of monetary compensation irrespective of acquittal.
No intention to marry her right from the beginning
Hon’ble Justice A.K. Mathur & Altamas Kabir of Supreme Court on 29/09/2006 rightly observed that “we are satisfied that the consent which had been obtained by the accused was not a voluntary one which was given by her under misconception of fact that the accused would marry her but this is not a consent in law. This is more evident from the testimony of the victim girl as well as witness who was functioning as Panchayat where the accused admitted that he had committed sexual intercourse and promised to marry her but he absconded despite the promise made before the Panchayat. That shows that the accused had no intention to marry her right from the beginning and committed sexual intercourse totally under the misconception of fact by prosecutrix that he would marry her. Therefore, we are satisfied that the conviction and sentence awarded to the appellant is correct and no case is made out for our interference. The appeals are dismissed”     (Yedla Srinivasa Rao Vs State of A.P., Appeal (crl.) 1369 of 2004,)
In the instant case the appellant Yedla Srinivasa Rao was convicted and sentenced to undergo seven years imprisonment on a charge of raping a 16-year-old girl. He promised to marry her but did not do so. After the girl became pregnant, a case of `rape' was registered against him. The trial court acquitted the accused holding that since the girl consented to the intercourse, it would not amount to rape. On appeal by the State, the Andhra Pradesh High Court reversed the order and awarded him seven-year imprisonment.
Hon’ble Supreme Court said in such cases “factors like the age of the girl, her education and her status in the society and likewise the social status of the boy’ are necessary considerations. If prosecutrix was also equally keen, then in that case the offence is condoned. But in case a poor girl placed in a peculiar circumstance where her father has died and she does not understand what the consequences may result for indulging into such acts and when the accused promised to marry but he never intended to marry right from the beginning then the consent of the girl is of no consequence. A consent obtained by misconception while playing a fraud is not consent.”
Girl of ‘tender age’ is more vulnerable
It was analyzed that in Jayanti Rani Panda the porsecutrix was aged 21-22 years old whereas in Yedla Srinivasa Rao case the age of the girl was very tender between 15-16 years. It is always matter of evidence whether the consent was obtained willingly or consent has been obtained by holding a false promise which the accused never intended to fulfill. If the accused persuaded a girl of tender age that he would marry her then such consent was not obtained voluntarily but under a misconception of fact and the accused right from the beginning never intended to fulfill the promise. Such fraudulent consent cannot be said to be consent so as to condone the offence of the accused.
It’s victimization and exploitation of innocent girls
While rejecting the Bail Application Hon'ble Justice V.K. Jain of Delhi High Court on 1st February, 2010 where the boy raped the girl after completing marriage formalities like ROKA observed “if I take the view that sexual intercourse with a girl, in the facts and circumstances such as in the present case, does not amount to rape, it will result in unscrupulous and mischievous persons, taking undue advantage of innocent girls by promising marriage with them, without having any intention to do so, re-assuring the girl and her family by making the two families meet each other and formalize the matter by ceremonies, such as an engagement, persuading the girl to have sexual intercourse with him by making her believe that he was definitely going to marry her and then abandoning her, after robbing her of what is most dear to her…… A view, which is likely to result in victimization or exploitation of innocent girls, needs to be avoided and the Courts need to take a view, which would discourage unscrupulous persons from taking advantage of innocent girls by alluring them and having sexual intercourse with them, on a false promise of marriage.”
Justice Jain condemning such criminal behavior wrote “taking a view that persuading a girl to have physical relations on the false promise of marriage, despite having no intention to marry, will in no case constitute rape, will amount to putting premium on a conduct which is not only highly reprehensible and abhorable but also criminal in nature. If this is allowed to happen, it will enable immoral and dishonest persons, including those who come to this country for such very purposes, to exploit girls belonging to weaker sections and lower strata of society by alluring them with false promise of marriage pressuring them to have physical relations with them by making them believe that they are going to marry them and that there was nothing wrong in having such relations with a person who is very soon going to be her husband and later on turn; their back at her, in a comfortable belief that the law being on their side, they can easily get away with their misdeeds. The courts cannot and should not give such a license to those who keep on looking for opportunities to exploit the sentiments and vulnerability of Indian girls who perceive marriage as a pious bonding; and not as a union of two bodies. Allowing such persons to go scot free after exploiting poor and helpless girls in this manner could never have been the intention of the legislature which considered rape to be such a heinous as to attract imprisonment up to life.” (Nikhil Parasar Vs State)
Rape…..rape….No rape!
But even after Supreme Court verdict, in July 2010 Justice Ambadas Joshi of Bombay High Court while acquitting a man, 42 years in a rape case, observed that sexual relationship after promising marriage and reneging on it does not amount to rape. Rathod, then 30 years old, was serving at a forest office near the victim's house. He developed physical relations with her and promised marriage. She informed her parents when she became pregnant and Rathod was arrested following a complaint lodged by her parents. Charged with repeatedly having sexual relations with an "underage" girl the sessions court sentenced him to 10-year rigorous imprisonment.

Legal eagles are puzzled
Legal opinions and verdicts on this particular aspect are vertically divided and confusing between the interpretation of ‘consent’ and ‘misconception of fact’ because law is not crystal clear and decision depends on ‘Facts and circumstances’ of each case. Consensus of judicial opinion is in favour of the view that the consent given by the victim to sexual intercourse with a person with whom she is deeply in love on  promise that he would marry her on a later date, cannot be said to be given under a misconception of fact.    Some courts are of the view that the so called consent under a false promise to marriage is no consent. Accordingly, the consent obtained in establishing physical relationship like husband and wife under false promise to marry the latter is no consent as per law.
In such cases the most difficult task is to prove that the accused had no intention to marry with the girl right from the beginning. He may say that I wanted to marry but my parents….cast….religion…’khap’ etc did not allowed. This legal jugglery of justice will continue, till the laws against crime against women are not amended by the legislatures.

Assam trooper arrested for raping tribal girl


Assam trooper arrested for raping tribal girl
May 08, 2010
http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/uncategorized/assam-trooper-arrested-for-raping-tribal-girl_100360623.html
Agartala, May 8 (IANS) A paramilitary trooper has been arrested on charges of making a false promise of marriage to a tribal girl in western Tripura and raping her, police said Saturday.
“We have arrested an Assam Rifles trooper Rajkiran Jamatia Friday night from Kalyanpur on the basis of a complaint lodged by the victim’s family,” sub-divisional police official Jayanta Chakraborty told IANS. Kalyanpur is 50 km north of Agartala.

Jamatia, now in jail, reportedly committed to marrying the 19-year-old tribal girl but subsequently fixed his wedding to another girl, the police official added.

Police are investigating the incident.

“In the tribals’ customary law, giving a false marriage pledge is a serious punishable crime,” customary law expert Kumud Kundu Chowdhury said.


Sex before marriage is rape: Delhi high court


Man denied bail after sex on false marriage promise
February 01, 2010
http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/uncategorized/man-denied-bail-after-sex-on-false-marriage-promise_100313226.html
New Delhi, Feb 1 (IANS) Declining bail to a man who had sex with a girl after deluding her with false promise of marriage, the Delhi High Court Monday termed it “rape” and said the man had played with the girl’s emotions.
Justice V.K. Jain declined to grant bail to the man who had petitioned for anticipatory bail after raping his fiancee.

The court said: “Persuading a girl to have physical relations on the false promise of marriage, despite having no intention to marry, will in no case constitute rape, (but) will amount to putting premium on a conduct which is not only highly reprehensible and abhorrent but also criminal in nature.”

“The courts cannot and should not give such a license to those who keep on looking for opportunities to exploit the sentiments and vulnerability of Indian girls who perceive marriage as a pious bonding and not as a union of two bodies,” the court said.

The court also said that bail should not be granted in such cases as there is a possibility of the accused escaping from the clutches of law.

“If a girl surrenders herself to a boy, who comes into contact with her for the first time only in connection with a proposal for her marriage with him and who not only proposes to marry her but also formalizes his promise and strengthens her belief in his promise by entering into a formal ceremony such as engagement with her and thereby convinces her that he is actually going to marry her, she does it not because she loves him or wants to have pleasure with him, but because she does not want to disappoint her future husband,” the court said.

In the present case, the accused Nikhil Parasar had come in contact with the victim through a marriage portal and their family agreed to their marriage.

Subsequently, their parents arranged a pre-marriage ceremony or ‘Roka’.

After the ceremony, the couple used to meet frequently and the accused had allegedly forced the girl to have sexual relations against her wishes. Later, the boy refused to marry her and she filed a criminal complaint against him after which he absconded.

Apprehending arrest, the accused approached the court for bail.
>>

Sex before marriage is rape: Delhi high court
Feb 2, 2010
http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report_sex-before-marriage-is-rape-delhi-high-court_1342233
The Delhi high court on Monday held that sex without marriage amounted to rape.

The court rejected pre-arrest bail to a man who repeatedly had sex with a woman but refused to marry her even after their engagement.

The woman stayed with her fiance, Nikhil Prasar, in Mumbai for a few days, “where they had fun, and then went to Delhi and stayed in a hotel where they had sex”.

When it came to fixing a date for marriage, however, Nikhil refused, on the grounds that he had learned that she belonged to a different caste.

The woman complained to the police and a rape case was registered.

Justice VK Jain said the caste factor was an afterthought by Prasar, who then absconded. Could he marry “any girl merely because she belonged to a particular caste or sub-caste, even if he did not approve of her personality, temperament, education, culture, upbringing, and family background", the court asked.

“The answer can, obviously, be in the negative," justice Jain said.

He said it appears that the man did not intend to marry the woman and that was why he did not wait for sex even till his formal engagement with her.

If he were so orthodox and conservative that he broke the marriage owing to caste differences, he should not have hurried in for sexual intercourse before marriage, the justice said.

The court held that if it was not held as rape, it would “result in unscrupulous and mischievous persons taking undue advantage of innocent girls by promising marriage with them".

Sexual intercourse before marriage amounts to rape or it will result in victimisation or exploitation of innocent girls, justice Jain said.

Sex on false promise of marriage is rape: Delhi High Court


Sex on false promise of marriage is rape: Delhi High Court
http://www.unp.me/f46/sex-on-false-promise-of-marriage-is-rape-court-67893/
Feb 5, 2010
NEW DELHI: Declining bail to a man who allegedly raped his fiancee and later refused to marry her, the Delhi high court said on Monday courts need to take a strict view of such cases.
Justice V K Jain refused to grant bail to the man, Nishant (name changed), who had filed a petition for anticipatory bail in a case where he is accused of raping a girl who was approved by his family and had even got enagaged to him.

"If a girl surrenders herself to a boy who comes in contact with her for the first time only in connection with a proposal for her marriage and then enters into a formal ceremony of engagement..she does it not because she loves him or wants to have pleasure with him, but because she doesn't want to disappoint her future husband,'' the HC held, rejecting the argument of the accused that it was consensual sex.

The HC said if a view was taken that persuading a girl to have physical relations on the false promise of marriage, despite having no such intention, does not constitute rape, "this will amount to putting premium on a conduct which is not only highly reprehensible and abhorable but also criminal in nature.''

Software engineer accuses friend of rape

http://testimonyrapevictimindia.blogspot.com/2011/06/criminal-record-of-shivalik-ghosh-of.htm

Software engineer accuses friend of rape
Noida, December 05, 2010
http://www.hindustantimes.com/Software-engineer-accuses-friend-of-rape/Article1-634578.aspx
A software engineer working in a BPO was allegedly raped by a friend in Noida after promising to marry her, police said on Saturday. The accused befriended her through a matrimonial website. The incident came to light Saturday when the 26-year-old woman, originally from Guwahati in Assam, filed a complaint with police. A rape case has been registered.
According to police, the woman, a resident of Sector-22, complained that Shivalik Ghosh, also a software engineer, befriended her on the internet through a matrimonial website and promised to marry her.

Ghosh, a resident of Gurgaon, raped her on several occasions and later refused to marry her. On some occasions, he came to her house and raped her after lacing her drinks with sedative, the victim's complaint said.

Criminal record of Shivalik Ghosh of Hero Honda company

http://elegalix.allahabadhighcourt.in/elegalix/WebShowJudgment.do


eLegalix - Allahabad High Court Judgment Information System (Judgment/Order in Text Format)

This is an UNCERTIFIED copy for information/reference. For authentic copy please refer to certified copy only. In case of any mistake, please bring it to the notice of Deputy Registrar(Copying).
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD 

AFR
Reserved
CRIMINAL REVISION NO. 1169 OF 2011
Shivalik Ghosh and another .......................... Revisionists
Vs.
State of U.P. And another ....................... Opposite Parties


Hon'ble Vinod Prasad, J.
Challenge in this revision by mother Chitali Ghosh(A2) and her son Shivalik Ghosh(A1), is to their summoning dated 24.1.2011 in criminal case no. 771 of 2011,State Vs Shivalik Ghosh and another, relating to crime no. 32 of 2010, for offences under Sections 323, 328, 376 I.P.C., P.S. Mahila Thana, Sector 32, NOIDA, District G.B. Nagar by A.C.J.M.-I, G.B. Nagar.
A glimpse of background facts, as are perceptible from the affidavit of Shivalik Ghosh filed in support of this revision, counter affidavit and rejoinder affidavits are that on 3.12.2010 at 12.45 p.m., victim-informant $#### @@@@ (R2) lodged an FIR at P.S. Mahila Thana NOIDA, G.B. Nagar as crime no. 32 of 2010 U/Ss 323, 328, 376 I.P.C. vide annexure no. 1 to the affidavit alleging therein that informant is a resident of H-137, Sector 22, NOIDA and was employed in a Software Company. In the month of August, 2010 while surfing on internet on Jeewan Sathi.Com she developed acquaintance with A1revisionist Shivalik Ghosh, resident of Maipal Krishna Apartment, I-1305, Shushant Lok, C-Block, Gurgaon, who was working with Hero Honda Private Ltd., Dharo Heda, Jaipur Road. On the faithful date 18.8.2010, A1 picked up R-2 from her company and carried her to Gurgaon where, he dissolved some intoxication in her cold drink and when R2 lost her senses that A1 outraged her modesty by raping her. After regaining consciousness, R2 resisted sexual assault on her but was pacified on a false deceitful assurance of solemnizing marriage with her. Taking advantage of the situation A1 started often visiting victim's abode and indulge in carnal intercourse both at NOIDA and Gurgaon and he continued to assure R2 regarding false promise of solemnizing marriage. Having some apprehension R2 demanded telephone number of A2 which was given to her by A1 after repeated insistence. Mother of R2 also conversed with A2 who did not object to tying up nuptial knot between A1 and R2 but postponed it for two years. When victim R2 telephoned A2 then also no objection was shown to the tying of knots by A2 and therefore, R2 being assured of marriage continued to succumb to the lustrous overtures of A1 and physical sexual contact between A1 and R2 continued. Cheating and deceiving R2 revisionist A1 even took loan of Rs. 50,000/- from her which was not paid back till the date of lodging of FIR by R2.In telephonic conversation between R2 and A2, on 1.9.2010, she was informed that Rs. 15 lacs loan is due on A1 and marriage between them shall be solemnized only after the said money is paid by the victim. When informed about physical relationship A2 replied that in between opposite sexes it not very unethical and is a normal conduct. On 13.9.2010,A1 consented to tie knots with R 2 in the presence of one Deepak but informed R 2 that details shall be finalized on arrival of A2 following day. R2 accompanied A1 to the airport to receive A2 but there, she was assaulted. A2 separated A1 from R2 who also refused to marry R2. Since R2 was deceived and cheated and her most precious honour was robbed off by A1 in conspiracy and connivance with A2 that victim R2 was left with no other option and hence she approached the police and lodged her FIR annexure 1 at PS Mahila Thana, Sector 32 NOIDA, district G.B. Nagar.
After registration of the crime investigation ensued and I.O. recorded statements of the victim and her mother,filed cumulatively as annexure no.4 and finally concluding investigation charge sheeted revisionist on 11.1.11, for offences U/Ss 323,328,376 IPC vide annexure no. 7.
A.C.J.M.-Ist, G.B. Nagar, in whose court charge sheet , annexure No. 7, was submitted took cognizance of the offences on 24.1.2011 and registered case no. 771 of 2011 against the revisionist and summoned them to stand trial for those offences by passing impugned order, which has now been challenged by the accused revisionists in instant revision.
Sri G.S. Chaturvedi, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Swetashwa Agarwal, advocate was heard for the revisionists and Sri Mayank Srivastava, and Miss Poonam Dubey, advocates were heard for the informant and Sri K.N. Bajpai, learned AGA, was heard for the respondent NO. 1 State. Memo of revision along with the affidavit, counter affidavit and rejoinder affidavits was also perused and considered.
Assailing the impugned judgment learned Senior Counsel contended that it is a case of consent. Victim is major employed in a Software Company and was capable of giving consent to carnal intercourse. Whatever happened between A1 and R2 was with census-id-idem and hence no criminality can be attached to it and consequently charge of rape is not disclosed and it must fail. In contemporary times of modern world physical living relationships between opposite sexes is not abhorred and are gaining grounds and, therefore, once the victim was a consenting party, revisionists should not be prosecuted submits learned Sr. counsel. Summated from such an angle impugned summoning order not infallible and be quashed. In support of his contentions, reliance was placed on an apex court decision in Uday Vs. State of Karnataka: (2003) 4 SCC 46. Concludingly, it was argued that the revision be allowed and impugned order of summoning be quashed and the revisionists be set free.
All the respondent counsel contended conversely and submitted that the entire submissions of the revisionist counsel centers around the submission that victims allegations are false and truthfulness of these allegations by the victim have been questioned. It is contended that at the stage of summoning no such exercise can be under taken and truthfulness or other wise of victims allegations can be adjudged only during trial and on this submission impugned order can not be assailed. A legitimate prosecution instituted after due investigation based on cogent and reliable statements prima facie disclosing commission of session's triable offences cannot be scuttled at its threshold by making a roving inquiry into the allegations leveled by the victim and accepting accused defence. There cannot be any pre-trial decision even before framing of charges. Consent or no consent has to established as a fact and that can be done only by affording opportunity to the victim and examining her as a witness. Whether R2 was consenting party or not can be divulged only by her and no body else and therefore she must of given chance to state that fact submitted learned respondent counsel. They further contended that it is not a case of no evidence and sketched facts discloses that after taking advantage of rape on victim damsel, she was blackmailed on deceitful assurances of marriage for many months which ultimately was refused. The deceit was played to silence victims outcry against crime committed by the revisionist. It was to muzzle her voice. Emotions of the victim were blackmailed to compel her to succumb to the lustrous design by A1 and hence there is no scope for intervention by this Court in impugned summoning order. It was further contended that the rape was committed against the will and consent at the very initial stage of the incident and consequently crime was complete on that day. Learned AGA additionally contended that it is a case of cheating as well and the accused should be prosecuted for that charge also. In support of their submissions reliance is placed on clause fifth of Section 375 I.P.C. Drawing curtain of the submissions it was stated that revision lacks merit and be dismissed.
I have considered the arguments by the rival contesting sides and have perused the entire material on record.
It is allegated by the victim that taking advantage of her acquaintance developed on the internet, A1, accused revisionist Shivalik Ghosh carried R2 to Gurgaon, where by offering her an intoxicated cold drink, her chastity was outraged. For this charge there is unambiguous clear and cogent allegation mention in the FIR, Annexure 1 and statement U/S 161 Cr.P.C. annexure 4 by the victim informant and resultantly there is credible material exist on record to prosecute revisionists for offence under Section 376 I.P.C. Further allegations by R2 are that by taking advantage of criminal act, A1 blackmailed her to commit future sexual assault at both placed in NOIDA and Gurgaon. To escape punishment for his depraved lustrous activities A1 practiced deceitful dexterity of giving false promises of solemnizing marriage with the victim and thereby continued to indulge in carnal intercourse with her. Such a representation by the accused was a fraud played upon the victim and therefore alleged consent obtained by A1 was of no consequence . A legal act cannot be be generated on fraud. Clause fifth of Section 375 IPC provides for such a situation. If a accused takes advantage of a lady on deceitful promise of solemnizing marriage and indulges into sexual intercourse with her it is rape. This has been so held by the Apex Court in the decision of Pradeep Kumar Verma Vs. State of West Bihar: AIR 2007 SC 3059, wherein Apex Court has observed as under:-
"19.. On the specific question whether the consent obtained on the basis of promise to marry which was not acted upon, could be regarded as consent for the purpose of Section 375 IPC, was dealt with by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Jayanti Rani Panda v. State of WB (1984 Cr.L.J. 1535). The relevant passage in this case has been cited in several other decisions. This is one of the cases referred to by this Court in Uday's case (supra) approvingly. Without going into the details of that case, the crux of the case can be discerned from the following summary given at para 7:
"Here the allegation of the complainant is that the accused used to visit her house and proposed to marry her. She consented to have sexual intercourse with the accused on a belief that the accused would really marry her. But one thing that strikes us is ... why should she keep it a secret from her parents if really she had belief in that promise. Assuming that she had believed the accused when he held out a promise, if he did at all, there is no evidence that at that time the accused had no intention of keeping that promise. It may be that subsequently when the girl conceived the accused might have felt otherwise. But even then the case in the petition of complainant is that the accused did not till then back out. Therefore it cannot be said that till then the accused had no intention of marrying the complainant even if he had held out any promise at all as alleged."
The discussion that follows the above passage is important and is extracted hereunder:
"The failure to keep the promise at a future uncertain date due to reasons not very clear on the evidence does not always amount to a misconception of fact at the inception of the act itself. In order to come within the meaning of misconception of fact, the fact must have an immediate relevance. The matter would have been different if the consent was obtained by creating a belief that they were already married. In such a case the consent could be said to result from a misconception of fact. But here the fact alleged is a promise to marry we do not know when. If a full-grown girl consents to the act of sexual intercourse on a promise of marriage and continues to indulge in such activity until she becomes pregnant it is an act of promiscuity on her part and not an act induced by misconception of fact. Section 90 IPC cannot be called in aid in such a case to pardon the act of the girl and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court can be assured that from the very inception the accused never really intended to marry her. "
(Emphasis supplied)
The learned Judges referred to the decision of the Chancery Court in Edgington v. Fitzmaurice (1885 (29) Ch.D.459) and observed :
"This decision lays down that a misstatement of the intention of the defendant in doing a particular act may be a misstatement of fact, and if the plaintiff was misled by it, an action of deceit may be founded on it. The particular observation at p. 483 runs to the following effect: There must be a misstatement of an existing fact. Therefore, in order to amount to a misstatement of fact the existing state of things and a misstatement as to that becomes relevant. In the absence of such evidence Section 90 cannot be called in aid in support of the contention that the consent of the complainant was obtained on a misconception of fact."
After referring to the case-law on the subject, it was observed in Uday's case (supra):
"It therefore appears that the consensus of judicial opinion is in favour of the view that the consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse with a person with whom she is deeply in love on a promise that he would marry her on a later date, cannot be said to be given under a misconception of fact. A false promise is not a fact within the meaning of the Code. We are inclined to agree with this view, but we must add that there is no strait-jacket formula for determining whether consent given by the prosecutrix to sexual intercourse is voluntary, or whether it is given under a misconception of fact. In the ultimate analysis, the tests laid down by the courts provide at best guidance to the judicial mind while considering a question of consent, but the court must, in each case, consider the evidence before it and the surrounding circumstances, before reaching a conclusion, because each case has its own peculiar facts which may have a bearing on the question whether the consent was voluntary, or was given under a misconception of fact. It must also weigh the evidence keeping in view the fact that the burden is on the prosecution to prove each and every ingredient of the offence, absence of consent being one of them."
20. The first two sentences in the above passage need some explanation. While we reiterate that a promise to marry without anything more will not give rise to misconception of fact within the meaning of Section 90, it needs to be clarified that a representation deliberately made by the accused with a view to elicit the assent of the victim without having the intention or inclination to marry her, will vitiate the consent. If on the facts it is established that at the very inception of the making of promise, the accused did not really entertain the intention of marrying her and the promise to marry held out by him was a mere hoax, the consent ostensibly given by the victim will be of no avail to the accused to exculpate him from the ambit of Section 375 clause second. This is what in fact was stressed by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Jayanti Rani Panda's case (supra) which was approvingly referred to in Uday's case (supra). The Calcutta High Court rightly qualified the proposition which it stated earlier by adding the qualification at the end - unless the court can be assured that from the very inception the accused never really intended to marry her. (emphasis supplied). In the next para, the High Court referred to the vintage decision of the Chancery Court which laid down that a misstatement of the intention of the defendant in doing a particular act would tantamount to a misstatement of fact and an action of deceit can be founded on it. This is also the view taken by the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Jaladu case (vide passage "ed supra). By making the solitary observation that a false promise is not a fact within the meaning of the Code, it cannot be said that this Court has laid down the law differently. The observations following the aforesaid sentence are also equally important. The Court was cautious enough to add a qualification that no strait-jacket formula could be evolved for determining whether the consent was given under a misconception of fact. Reading the judgment in Uday's case as a whole, we do not understand the Court laying down a broad proposition that a promise to marry could never amount to a misconception of fact. That is not, in our understanding, the ratio of the decision. In fact, there was a specific finding in that case that initially the accused's intention to marry cannot be ruled out."
In view of above exposition of law by the Apex Court, there is no scope for this Court to take a contrary view. Contention of learned Senior Counsel that it is a case consent, therefore, cannot be accepted and is hereby repelled.
Another significant aspect of the matter is that offence of rape can be made out against an accused, if the rape is committed against the will of the victim or her consent. There may be instances where the victim may consent for rapuit carnaliter cognovit without having a will for the same and vice versa. For example an unmarried major girl though may have desire for sexual entanglement with her beloved but may not consent for performance of such an act prior to marriage. Thus she may have will but no consent. If in such a situation a sexual assault is made upon her, it will be a case of rape against her consent falling under clause second of 375 IPC. Under the first clause, if a sexual intercourse is done against the will of the victim then also it is rape. In the present case, there was total absence of will and consent both as according to victim's allegations she was in capable of having a will and giving of consent both before she was raped by A1. At subsequent occasions her consent was obtained by fraud and misconception of facts and therefore it was not a free consent and accused can not be conferred any benefit on that score. The case of the revisionists, therefore false in both the above categories mentioned in clause first and second of section 375 I.P.C.
Judging from another angle harangued submission by revisionist counsel is based upon truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations leveled by the victim. This Court cannot scuttle the prosecution at its inception on that basis. Genuineness of the allegations have to be tested on the touchstone of probability or improbability during the trial after affording fullest opportunity to the victim. To castigate her allegations as untruthful at the very threshold of the prosecution without affording any opportunity to the victim to substantiate her charge, will be against principles of natural justice and fair play and will thwart course of justice. Attour question involved in the present case is not that the victim was a consenting party to the sexual overtures of A1 but the question is whether rape was committed upon her on the occasion complained of with her consent or not?. Even if hypothetically it is accepted that victim had lost her virginity at any single point of time on any occasion is no reason to commit rape upon her at subsequent occasions on false promises, which accused never intended to fulfill and abide by. This question has invited attention of Hon'ble Apex Court in the decision of State of U.P. Vs. Munshi: AIR 2009 SC 370 wherein it has been observed by Hon'ble Apex Court vide paragraph no.8 thereof as follows:-
"8. Even assuming that the victim was previously accustomed to sexual intercourse, that is not a determinative question. On the contrary, the question which was required to be adjudicated was did the accused commit rape on the victim on the occasion complained of. Even if it is hypothetically accepted that the victim had lost her virginity earlier, it did not and cannot in law give licence to any person to rape her. It is the accused who was on trial and not the victim. Even if the victim in a given case has been promiscuous in her sexual behaviour earlier, she has a right to refuse to submit herself to sexual intercourse to anyone and everyone because she is not a vulnerable object or prey for being sexually assaulted by anyone and everyone."
Turning towards decision relied upon by the revisionists' counsel it is of no help to the revisionists. Firstly, that decision was rendered after full fledged trial which is not the case in the instant revision. Secondly, in that case, friendship had developed earlier and on that a proposal for marriage was given but caste of both the girl and boy was an impediment. Both the victim and the accused were neighbours and resided in a close vicinity. It was at 12'O clock in the night, on the date of incident, that accused had appeared on the window of victim's room and called her out for having conversation. Since victim was in deep affection with him, she accepted invitation and both of them thereafter went to a constructed house of the appellant. Some cuddling etc. took place and thereafter both of them had entered into sexual intercourse.
Facts of the present case are however, entirely different. Here, at the first instance, after alluring the victim, her chastity was ravished under administration of intoxication. False promises were made subsequent to the said rape to shield skin from clutches of law by the accused. At no point of time, there was any love and affection between A1 and R2. In fact, victim was at the receiving ends because of rape committed upon her at the very first instance by A1. All subsequent promises were deceitful means to keep mouth of the victim shut and which promises were never intended to be fulfilled. First of all half a lac of rupees were obtained and thereafter fifteen lacs were demanded to solemnize the marriage. Happening of the incident is indicative of the fact that the accused never intended to marry R2.Thus facts of the present case are entirely different from the decision of Uday's case (Supra).
Wrapping up discussions, I do not find any illegality or legal infirmity either of facts or that of law in the impugned summoning order, which has been passed on the basis of a charge sheet submitted against the revisionists after due investigation conducted in consonance with statutory provisions of law.
This revision being bereft of merits, is dismissed. Interim order dated 25.2.2011 stands vacated.
Revisionists are directed to surrender and face trial.
Dt.19.5.2011
AKG/Rkg/ 



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